China
has become one of the largest solar panels suppliers in the world since the
past few years. According to IHS report (2012), six out of the world’s top ten
solar module manufacturers are from China, with Yingli Green leading the list. Today,
Chinese-produced solar panels have successfully increased their share in the
European market from virtually zero to 80% in a short period, which countries
such as France and Italy said to be impossible (The Economist, 2013).
Therefore, investigations had been
conducted, and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said that the European
Commission had decided to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese solar panels after
discovering they were being sold at up to 88% below cost in the European market
(APF, 2013). Despite
the disagreement from countries such as Germany and United Kingdom, the
Commission will still levy import duties averaging 47% on Chinese panel makers (Reuters
b, 2013). Apparently, the Commission is trying to protect against what it sees
as Chinese dumping cheap goods in Europe; however the action to impose such a large
amount of tariff could result in just that aftereffect which both China and the
European Union want to avoid.
First of all, whether
China is ‘dumping cheap goods’ in Europe is an argument itself. Dumping refers
to the action of governments to favour domestic producers by subsidising their
exports, making the goods to be sold at artificially low prices in the foreign
market (Sloman, Wride and Garratt, 2012). As the result, prices of the goods no
longer reflect the comparative cost in a free market. When EU investigation was
launched in year 2004, it was concluded that Chinese
solar panel manufacturers gained advantages from government subsidies, but the
claim was denied by China (Matlack, 2013). However, Haley and Haley (2013)
pointed out in their book recently that the Chinese solar panel makers are subsidized by the government, frequently getting free land
and loans they never have to pay back.
The common question is what happen when subsidies are
given and how subsidies will lower the selling price of the goods. From the
economics point of view, when China government starts giving subsidies to the
solar panel makers, the cost of producing the goods will be lowered, hence
allowing the producer to come up with a lower price product. When the cost of
production decreases, the more profit a firm can made at any price, therefore,
firms are willing to produce more due to the fact of increasing profit. In
other words, China government subsidies to the solar panel makers will shift
supply curve to the right, increasing the production of solar panels in the
market. Figure 1.1 illustrates what happen when the supply increases.
Also, it is noticeable that at the original price level P0,
there is now a surplus which forces the price down. Thus, it is concluded that
the
reason why Chinese solar panels are cheaper is closely related to the
production amount. Between the year 2009 and 2011, the Chinese solar panel
production quadrupled to more than the entire global demand, which is 150% of
the amount of solar panels needed by the whole world (Reuters a, 2013). In this
case, China has produced too much of solar panels, creating an overproduction
in the market.
Figure
1.2 shows the effect of overproduction of solar panels in the market. When
overproduction occurs, it is a market failure because the market is now
inefficient. The inefficient here means either the resources are not being
fully utilized in the market, or there are not enough resources in the market.
On the other hand, efficient market is where the demand and supply curve meets.
In Figure 1.2, it is assumed that the efficient quantity is 10,000 solar panels
a day, and now due to subsidies the production expanded to 15,000 solar panels
a day, a deadweight loss arise. The deadweight loss is a social loss, which
refers to the decrease in consumer and producer surplus.
Perhaps
this is why the Commission decided to impose tariff on Chinese-produced solar
panels, to create a fair trade environment in the European solar panel market. A
tariff or custom duty is a type of indirect tax imposes on goods imported from
outside the country. Unlike direct taxes for example personal income tax, which
are paid directly out of people’s incomes, tariff is not paid directly by the
consumer, but indirectly via the sellers of the good. By imposing the tariff,
the Commission wish to decrease the amount of solar panels produced by China,
as well as protecting the European solar panel industry, which 25,000 jobs are
threatened by the increasing market share of Chinese solar panels (APF,
2013).
Although tariff can
be used to correct market failures, but tariff can have adverse effects
themselves. One such effect is the deadweight loss that results when tariff is
imposed on the Chinese-produced solar panels.
Figure
1.3 shows the demand and supply of Chinese solar panels. Equilibrium is formed
at the point a, where the supply and demand curve meets, initially at a price
of P1 and a level of sales of Q1. If tariff is imposed on
the good, the supply curve will shift leftwards by the amount of tax, to S+
tax, and meet demand curve at point b. Equilibrium price increases to P2
and equilibrium quantity falls to Q2. The Chinese solar panels
makers will receive an after-tax price of P2− tax, which means even
though the equilibrium price increase, the actual price they receive will be
even less than the initial equilibrium price because have to deduct the tax.
Other
than price and quantity, there are also changes to the consumer and producer
surplus. Since the supply curve shift left, the consumer surplus now falls from
areas 1+2+3, to area 1 only. Meanwhile, the producer surplus falls from areas
4+5+6 to area 6 only. However, the deadweight loss is not the total surplus
falls by areas 2+3+4+5. This is because there is gain to the government from
the tax revenue, which is considered as a gain to the population from the
resulting government expenditure. The revenue from the tax is called the
government surplus (Sloman, Wride and Garratt, 2012). It is given by areas 2+4.
After including government surplus, there is still a loss in the society, which
is the deadweight loss of the tax (or the excess burden) at areas of 3+5.
The
subject whether tariff should be imposed on the Chinese solar panels depends on
the impact of such tariff to the market and consumers. If it is doing more good
than harm, it should be imposed, otherwise, it should not. The Commission
should consider the benefits of such a tariff which is the tax revenue and the
reduction of Chines solar panels quantity in the market against the possible deadweight
loss. Although the tariff itself is paid by the Chinese solar panel makers, the
consumers will still have to pay a higher price for the product due to the tax
since China beats Germany and become the largest solar panel supplier starting
from year 2010 (Rapoza, 2013). Looking at the issue in long term, imposing a
high tariff on the goods might lead to shortage in European market because the
firms are not willing to produce or export their goods to Europe. It is
predicted that a trade loss worth up to €500 billion (RM2.02 trillion) will
occur if the tariff is imposed on Chinese solar panels (APF,
2013).
Another interesting
fact is, the next day after EU said it would impose tariff on Chinese solar
panels, the China’s Ministry of
Commerce announced that it had begun a trade investigation on the wines
imported from the European Union. According to Bradsher (2013), the
27 countries of the European Union exported $980.7 million worth of wine to
China last year, and most of it was from France. There is less doubt that China
is trying to send a retaliatory signal to EU as the answer to EU’s decision to
impose tariff on Chinese solar panels. The Commission and China should really
sit down and discuss the solutions to this matter instead locking themselves in
a series of trade disputes which bring no benefit to both sides.
List
of Reference
APF (2013) EU imposes levies on Chinese solar
panels. The Edge Financial Daily. 5 June, p. 2.
Bradsher, K. (2013) China aims at Europe’s wine
after solar panel action. The New York
Times [online] 5 June.
Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/business/global/china-to-investigate-eu-wine-after-subsidy-and-dumping-complaints.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Haley, U.C.V. and Haley, G.T. (2013) Subsidies to
Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy. New
York: Oxford University Press.
IHS (2012) The
Top 12 Solar Module Manufacturer [online]. [Accessed 5 June 2013].
Matlack, C (2013) Solar trade fight between China
and the EU heats up. Bloomberg Businessweek [online] 21 May. Available
from: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-21/solar-trade-fight-between-china-and-the-eu-heats-up
[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Rapoza, K. (2013) China solar panel makers brace for
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[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Reuters a(2013) EU agrees China solar panel duties
in bold move. The Edge Financial Daily [online] 9 May. Available from: http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/in-the-financial-daily/238384-eu-agrees-china-solar-panel-duties-in-bold-move.html
[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Reuters b(2013) China, EU to discuss trade disputes.
The Edge Financial Daily [online] 27 May. Available from: http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/in-the-financial-daily/239970-china-eu-to-discuss-trade-disputes.html
[Accessed 5 June 2013].
Sloman, J., Wride, A. and Garratt, D. (2012)
Economics. 8th ed. Essex: Pearson Education Limited.
The Economist (2013) Outlook: cloudy. The
Economist [online] 8 June. Available from: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21579020-spat-over-solar-panels-outlook-cloudy
[Accessed 8 June 2013].



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